MORTGAGES-THE GENESIS OF THE LIEN THEORY by LLOYD, WILLIAM H.
MORTGAGES-THE GENESIS OF THE
LIEN THEORY
WmLiAm H. L oYD
Everyone is supposed to know what a mortgage is. With most the
experience is personal; in the course of a generation few roof trees
avoid this affliction. Yet on closer examination it will be found that
much mental confusion exists as to the nature of the transaction; which
is not to be wondered at, seeing that few courts in the United States are
in full accord upon the subject, and that in many of the states the instru-
ment in common use is in flat contradiction to the accepted theory.
Whether the so called title or so called lien theory prevails, there are
many incongruities in the application of both doctrines, making the
subject difficult to deal with as a general problem of jurisprudence,
although from a practical point of view, the discrepancies cause less
harm than might possibly be anticipated, owing to the fact that a mort-
gage question is usually a local question, answered by empirical rules,
well. apprehended, if not wholly understood by the indigenous
conveyancer.
The statement sometimes found in the older books that the English
law of mortgage is borrowed from the Roman law must not be taken
literally. Comparative law warns us against assuming a common
source for all institutions designed to meet analogous needs. Accord-
ing to common accounts the Roman law of real security went through
three stages.1 'The oldest form was the fiducia, an actual conveyance by
borrower to lender, formal and effectual in law to vest ownership in the
lender (mancipatio or in jure cessio), subject to an agreement (contrac-
tus fiduciae) that upon due payment of the debt the lender would
reconvey the property. Upon payment of the debt and refusal to recon-
vey, the dbtor had an action, which entailed infamy upon the creditor;
and, by the lex commissoria, abolished, by Constantine, upon non-
payment of the debt the property passed absolutely to the creditor. The
second form was the pignus (pawn) which arose by transfer of the
possession to the creditor, the ownership remaining with the borrower.
The third form was the hypotheca, a pledge by agreement without
change of possession, first recognized in connection with the right of
the landlord over the goods of his tenant, and later extended to all cases
in which it was agreed between borrower and lender that any property
should be security for a debt without transfer of possession to the
1 Salkowski, Roinan Private Law (Whitfield transl. 1886) 480; Hunter, Roman
Law (3d ed. 1897) 430-434; Buckland, Text-Book of Roman Law (1921) 470.
Cf. Wigmore, The Pledge-Idea III. (1898) II HARv. L. REv. I8, 31.
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lender. So also by operation of law (tacita hypotheca) an implied
hypothec was given to certain classes of creditors over the property of
their debtors, as in the case of the exchequer; or of wives, minors, and
legatees over the property of husbands, curators, and heirs. The
advantage of the hypothec lay in its flexibility; its disadvantage was the
ease with which it could be used to give fraudulent preferences, a fault
to a great extent overcome in modern continental jurisprudence by
systems of registration. The hypothec of the Roman law applied
equally to land and chattels, but in many modern states it is now limited
to immovable property.
2
If England had followed the Roman law it is probable that it would
have copied some mature form of the hypothec in contemporary use.
But in Europe during the Middle Ages the hypothec was for a time
almost lost sight of amidst a welter of barbarian customs and crude
experiments at land-gage.3 The feudal attitude toward the alienability
of land was very different from that of the Roman republic. In such
conveyancing as there was it is probable that here and there a learned
clerk preserved in some half understood Latin form a phrase or two of
Roman origin. But, as Professor Hazeltine has shown, the English
law of gage is Germanic, "starts from the conception, in the Anglo-
Saxon days of barter and self-help, that wed or vadium delivered to
the gagee is a provisional satisfaction, a provisional payment, a redeem-
able forfeit." 4 In the ensuing years, as the principle of collateral
security slowly developed, the law went through many changes, saw
many experimental forms of pledging land, a proceeding repugnant to
the sentiments of a society where land is family property or has recently
been so regarded. The story is, after all, only a part of the history of
the growth of credit transactions, so difficult for the primitive mind to
grasp; so necessary in an age of co-operation.
As is well known, the form of pledge of land which ultimately pre-
vailed was that known as the mortgage, simple in theory; roughly
corresponding in development to the stage reached by the Roman
fiducia. As it still is in form so it was at first in fact, a conveyance
of the legal title to the lender, subject to a provision that if the borrower
paid the debt on a prescribed day, the legal title should revest in him,
and he or his heirs might reenter. If the debt was not paid on the day
named, the estate of the creditor became absolute. After default no
right of redemption was admitted.5 The mortgagee, in short, took an
estate in fee defeasible upon condition subsequent, and in the books of
' Holland, Jurisprudence (I2th ed. 1917) 232-233. French Civil Code, art. 2119.
'Brissaud, History of French Private Law (Cont. Leg. Hist. Series, 1912) 602
et seq.
'Hazeltine, The Gage of Land in Mediaeval England (19o4) 17 HARV. L. REv.
549, (195o) 18 HARv. L. REv. 36. Reprinted 3 Sel. Essays in Anglo-Aner. Leg.
Hist. (19o9) 646.
'Britton, bk. 3, ch. 15, sec. 6; Coke, Littleton, *205; 2 Poll6ck and Maitland,
Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed. 1905) 122; 3 Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law (19o9) 11o.
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the time the law of mortgages is treated as part of the law of estates on
condition. True, the estate of the lender was until default a security;
if he died the debt was payable to his executor, as Littleton puts it,
"because the money at the beginning trenched to the feofee in manner
as a dutie." But the strictness with which conditions were construed
at law tended to obscure this phase of the transaction. An estate, as
Coke observes, was not to be divested without true and effectual pay-
ment.6 As a device of the period of strict law, the mortgage, so shaped,
was in harmony with the social and economic conditions. As long as
the administration of justice is slow, weak and formal, the creditor will
secure himself by that possession which is said of-old to be nine points
in the law. The borrower, if he would obtain the accommodation, must
take the risk incidental to his unfavorable position.
The interference of the court of chancery with the mortgage contract
was contemporaneous with and in fact a part of the movement for law
reform through equity jurisprudence. Just as in the case of penal
bonds, relief in chancery against the strict terms of mortgages was first
given on special grounds. But as early as the reign of James I the
practice of relieving the mortgagor in default upon payment of debt and
interest seems to have become common, and was well established by the
time of Charles I.7 The policy was not without its critics, among them
Lord Chief Justice Hale who laments that "by the growth of equity the
heart of the common law is eaten out."8  But the principles adopted in
chancery prevailed because, without the aid of legislation, they gave
effect to the economic tendencies of the time. The mortgagor's equity
of redemption and, as *a concomitant, the mortgagee's equity of fore-
closure were established beyond dispute. Indeed by an Act of 1734
the courts of law were given power in a suit for the recovery of the
debt, or in ejectment by the mortgagee, on tender of principal and inter-
est by the mortgagor, to order the discharge of the mortgage and to
compel a reconveyance. Henceforth the mortgage was in legal theory
an estate on condition, in equity a loan on security, a transaction that
in its varied terms eluded precise definition. "That is the worst of our
mortgage deed-," says Maitland, "owing to the action of equity, it is
'Coke, Littleton, *209-210; Sheppard, Touchstone, *141; Goodall's Case (1597,
K. B.) 5 Co. 95.
1I Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction (1846) 6oi; Kerby, Historical Sketch of the
Equitable Jurisdiction (i89o) 143; Toth, 132; How v. Vigures (1628) I Ch. 32.
'Roscarrick v. Barton (1672) 1 Ch. Cas. 217. In Salt v. Marquess of North-
ampton [1892] A. C. I, 18, it is said by Lord Bramwell: "Whether it would not
have been better to have held people to their bargains, and taught them by exper-
ience not to make unwise ones, rather than relieve them when they had done so,
may be doubtful. We should have been spared the double condition of things,
legal rights and equitable rights, and a system of documents which do not mean
what they say. But the piety or love of fees of those who administered equity
has thought otherwise. And probably to undo this work would be more costly and
troublesome than to continue it."
97 Geo. I, C. 20.
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one long suppressio veri and suggestio falsi. It does not in the least
explain the rights of the parties; it suggests that they are other than
really they are."'10
It has been stated frequently that the result of the decisions of the
court of chancery was to reduce the mortgagee's interest to a mere
security or charge on the -land. But this has never been literally true
in England where chancery has not interfered directly with the legal
doctrine but has kept consistently within its own sphere of action. A
mortgage made by conveyance, the common method, and not by way of
charge only, confers upon the mortgagee the estate of the mortgagor.
Aside from express agreement the rights of the mortgagor in possession
are no more, in some respects less than those of a tenant at will. When
the debt is discharged the reconveyance is by deed.1' All this chancery
concedes, while at the same time it treats the equity of *redemption not
as a mere right but as an estate which the mortgagor may deal 'vith in
any way consistent with the rights of the mortgagee in his security.
2
The- fact that through the supremacy of equity over law' 3 the equitable
viewpoint is for most purposes the more important does not militate
"against the legal doctrine.
Whether, then, the mortgage so developed can be designated cor-
rectly as a lien depends upon what is understood by that word, a term
described by Mr. Justice Erie as "intensely undefined."' 4 By the
common law, says Mr. Justice Grier, a lien is "a right in one man to
retain that which is in his possession belonging to another, till certain
demands of him, the person in possession, are satisfied. In courts of
equity the term lien is used as synonymous with a charge or incum-
brance upon a thing, where there is neither jus in re nor ad rem, nor
possession of the thing."' 5 Clearly a mortgage does not come within
the description of a lien as that word is understood at common law or
in equity, unless it be an informal or so called equitable mortgage.
But the jurisprudence of England and America has never been careful
or precise in the use of technical words, and "lien" has now come to
mean, in a popular sense, any hold which one person has upon the
"Maitland, Equity (199o) 269.
"%21 Hals. Laws Eng. 158, 186, 3ri; 3 Pomeroy, Equity (3d. ed. i9o5) sec. 1184;
Copestake v. Hoper [19o8, C. A.] 2 Ch. io.
"Casborne v. Scarfe (738, Ch.) i Atk. 6o3; Heath v. Pugh (1881) L. R. 6
Q. B. Div. 345; Tarn v. Hunter (1888) L. R. 39 Ch. Div. 456.
"Judicature Act (1873) 36 & 37 Viet. c. 66, sec. 25, subsec. ii.
"'Brunsdon v. Allard (859, Q. B.) 2 El. & El. ig.
'Peck v. Jennwss (1849, U. S.) 7 How. 612; Jones, Liens (3d ed. 1914) see. 3;
Salmond, Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1913) 402. In Conrad v. Atlantic Ins. Co. (1828,
U. S.) i Pet. 386, 441, it is said by Mr. Justice Story: "It is true, that in discus-
sions in Courts of Equity, a mortgage is sometimes called a lien for a debt And
so it certainly is, and something more; it is a transfer of the property itself, as
security for the debt .... It is therefore only in a loose and general sense that
it is sometimes called a lien, and then only by way of contrast to an estate absolute,
and indefeasible."
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property of another as security for a debt or demand. What change
of view, then, has led so many courts, in spite of the form of the instru-
ment, in the teeth of all the ancient precedents, to insist that the
transaction does not give rise to a title but to a lien only?
The new theory is frequently traced to some words of Lord Mans-
field, although that learned Judge cannot be charged with actual innova-
tions in this branch of the law. The tradition that he systematically
disregarded the rules of the common law for those of the civil law is
largely apocryphal.' 6 In Keech v. HallJ 7 he distinctly laid down that
the mortgagor was no more than a tenant at will subject to ejectment
without notice to quit. But in several cases, in other respects decided
wholly in accordance with precedent, he did use language which, taken
without regard to the context lends itself to very broad construction.
In Martin v. Mowlin,'5 in determining that a mortgage was personal
property of the mortgagee, he said: "A mortgage is a charge upon the
land: and whatever would give the money, will carry the estate in the
land along with it, to every purpose." This statement is no stronger
than that of Lord Hardwicke twenty years earlier in a case in which
Lord Mansfield, then Mr. Murray, was of counsel. The Lord Chan-
cellor there said: "Where a mortgage is made of an estate, that is only
considered as a security for money due, the land is the accident attend-
ing upon the other; and when the debt is discharged, the interest in the
land follows of course."'19 In another case Lord Mansfield speaks of a
mortgage as "a mere security" ;20 and later, in the repeatedly quoted
case of King v. St. Michaels,2" he said: "A mortgagee notwithstanding
the form has but a chattel, and the mortgage is only a security.... It
is an affront to common sense to say the mortgagor is not the real
owner."
In each of these cases the judgment is in accord with the orthodox
views of mortgage law; in none were the quoted words necessary to the
decision; their importance lies in the fact that they did not proceed
from the chancery bench but were the utterances of a common law
judge, a very distinguished judge whose statements carried great weight
in the American courts. It is quite possible that the attitude of Lord
Mansfield and the equity judges who were his contemporaries toward
18 Campbell, Lives of the Chief $Tstices, ch. 34. Cf. Lord Redesdale in Shannon
v. Bradstreet (18o3, Ir. Ch.) i Sch. & Lef. 52.
'1 (778, K. B.) i Doug. 21. See also Moss v. Gallinzore (1779, K. B.) I
Doug. 279.
" (176o, K. B.) 2 Burr. 969; and note Judge Trowbridge's criticism in (1813)
8 Mass. 554, 557, et seq.
"Richards v. Syms (i74o) Barn. Ch. go. See also Casborne v. Scarfe, supra,
note 12; and Brown v. Gibbs (1699) Prec. Ch. 97, where Lord Somers is reported
as saying that "the mortgage is looked upon as a personal contract, and the mort-
gagee has no interest beyond his money .....
20Eaton v. Jaques (0780, K. B.) 2 Doug. 455.
(1781, K. B.) 2 Doug. 630.
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mortgages was influenced by the civil law, although this is not apparent
in their judgments. In this connection it is interesting to note that in
popular works on the civil law translated into English the French
hypoth~que is rendered as mortgage,22 an unfortunate translation and
possible source of confusion, since the mortgage of English law, even as
modified in equity, bears only a limited analogy to the continental
hypothec, which, following the Roman law, is essentially, a potential
right of distraint and includes besides mortgages, liens for rent and
taxes as well as other charges and preferred claims22 referred by
English and American law to other legal categories.
But it is unsafe to attribute too much force to the chance dicta of
judges, however eminent, when these utterances are themselves perhaps
no more than straws showing the direction of the juridical wind, as it
were; signs of social and economic tendencies silently at work. Since
possession by the mortgagee had become an unprofitable burden and the
practice of permitting the mortgagor to retain possession had become
universal, it was inevitable that sooner or later common opinion would
regard the mortgagor as owner and the mortgagee as a creditor.
Conveyancers cautiously gave effect to this conception; it became
the practice to grant only a long term of years by way of mortgage, to
avoid the danger that after breach of condition dower would attach as
well as other encumbrances of the mortgagee, and so that, on the death
of the mortgagee, the term should vest in his personal representatives
who were entitled in equity to receive payment of the loan.2 4  Not until
chancery had established the supremacy of its view did mortgages in
fee become again usual. If no one had been concerned in the transac-
tion except mortgagor and mortgagee the divergent theories of law
and equity would have caused little friction incapable of adjustment by
slight modifications of the terms of the conveyance. A clause providing
for possession by the mortgagor until default would have blocked one
source of misunderstanding. It was rather in its external aspects, its
political implications that the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee
called for discussion and insisted on a theory from the time its peculiar
character had been detected.
Thus in the case of an estate to which an advowson was attached,
while the mortgagee, as having the legal estate had the right of presen-
tation at law; a court of equity would compel the mortgagee to present
the nominee of the mortgagor. For the mortgagee was permitted no
more than principal and interest, and a presentation to a church was
an advantage for which the mortgagee could not give credit on an
'Ayliffe, A New Pandect of Roman Civil Law, bk. IV, tit. 18; Domat, Civil
Law (Strahan transl. 1722) bk. III, tit i; i Browne, Civil Law (1840) 201.
" Brissaud, op. cit. at p. 615; Wigmore, The Pledge-Idea, L (1897) IO HARV.
L. REv. 321; Digest, lib. XX.
242 Blackstone, Commentaries, *158; Powell, Mortgages (Amer. ed. 1828, from
6th Eng. ed. 1826) 703.
MORTGAGES
account, upon redemption, without an admission of simony. 25 Under
the poor laws the question arose as to whether a settlement was acquired
by one in possession of land subject to a mortgage and the decision
was in favor of the mortgagor because, in the words of Lord Kenyon,
"neither the Courts of Law or Equity lose sight of what the parties
intended."2  Of a similar character was the question raised in
Wetherell v. Hall,27 where the defendant in a penal action was charged
with shooting game not being qualified by the ownership of lands of the
clear value of £Ioo per annum. It appeared that the defendant was
seized, in right of his wife, of lands of the yearly value of £103, but
they had been mortgaged for £400. Judgment was for the plaintiff,
Lord Mansfield saying: "We consider the defendant's interest in this
court just as it would be considered in a court of equity. It is an
interest subject to the payment of the mortgage; it is a qualification of
the property; and, though it is not necessary that he should have a
legal estate, he must have such property in the land as shall produce a
clear income of £Ioo; or it might be carried so far, as that he might
have nothing and yet enjoy the privilege. What then are a mortgagor
and a mortgagee in chancery? One the owner, and the other as having
a charge upon the land; and the charge goes with it."
Even more significant was the question of the effect of a mortgage
upon the franchise. As early as 143028 the county franchise was limited
to persons possessing a freehold worth forty shillings a year above all
charges (outre les reprises). Who then had the vote, mortgagor or
mortgagee? When contests for the counties' representation in Parlia-
ment grew frequent, and the rights of voters more closely scrutinized,
Parliament found it necessary to remove a disqualification which
affected a vast number of voters by providing that no person should
vote for members of Parliament "by reason of any trust estate or
mortgage, unless such trustee or mortgagee be in actual possession or
receipt of the rents and profits of the same estate; but that the mort-
gagor, or cestui que trust, in possession, shall and may vote for the same
estate, notwithstanding such mortgage or trust. '2 9  But, where land
"Jory v. Cox (1697) Prec. Ch. 7,; Ainhurst v. Dawling (17oo, CI) 2 Vern.
401; Dynwke v. Hobart (1704) I Brown, Pail. Cas. 81; Attorney-General v.
Hesketh (17o6, Ch.) 2 Vern. 549; Gaily v. Selby (1721, Ch.) i Str. 403;
Mackensie v. Robinson (1747, Ch.) 3 Atk. 559; Dyer v. Lord Craven (1786, Ch.)
Dick. 662.
"King v. Edingtm (18Ol, K. B.) i East, 288. Cf. King v. St. Michaels, supra
note 21; King v. Chariley (1796, K. B.) 6 T. R. 755; Newark v. Pompton
(1813) 3 N. J. L. 1038; Barkhamnsted v. Farnington, (1818) 2 Conn. 6oo; New-
London v. Sutton (1821) 2 N. H. 4O1; Mount Washington v. Clarksburgh (1837)
36 Mass. 294.
" (1782, K. B.) Caldecott, 23o. In 1779 Blackstone, J., ruled contra at the
Thetford assizes, 2 Luders' Elec. Cas. 480. '
1 (1429) 8 Hen. VI, c. 7. Cf. (1432) io Hen. VI, c. 2; (1745) 18 Geo. II, c.
18; Heywood, County Elections (1790) 62.
(1696) 7 & 8 Wm. III, c. 25, sec. 7. Substantially re-enacted, (1832) 2 Win.
IV, cl 45, sec. 23; (1843) 6 & 7 Vict ch. 18, sec. 74.
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was mortgaged, was the interest paid to be considered as a deduction
from or charge upon the annual value? The point seems to have
been first fully considered in the Bedfordshire election contest of 1785
where it was held by the committee, who seem to have been greatly
influenced by Wetherell v. Hall,30 that interest upon a mortgage which
reduced the value of the estate to less than forty shillings would invali-
date the vote, notwithstanding the mortgagor's ability to pay the interest
from other property.3 ' In a similar contest at Crickdale a few days
later there was a contrary ruling, 2 but subsequent decisions by the
courts settled the point in accordance with the Bedfordshire commit-
tee's finding.33 It is hardly to be doubted that these cases of various
sorts involving the public rights of the mortgagor, and the discussions
that attended them, served to bring into clearer relief the anomalies of
the mortgage contract. And while they cannot be said to have
disturbed established precedents at law, their tendency was to show that
in most instances the equitable view more nearly represented the
intention of the parties.
To America the colonists brought the law of mortgages very much as
they found it in the mother country, making comparatively few statu-
tory innovations, except that, in common with other conveyances, mort-
gages were required to be recorded.34 In some of the colonies, the
absence of a court of chancery led to the introduction of statutory
methods of foreclosure and redemption. 5 But, compared with the
voluminous statutes on other topics, the amount of legislation was rela-
tively small. When cases come to be reported, the title of the mortgagee,
at law, is upheld as a matter of course.38 Nevertheless, the pains taken
by the courts to make clear the distinction between the legal and equit-
able view of the mortgagor's interest indicates that the judges are well
aware of a popular misconception, if it can be so called, widely preva-
lent. As a matter of fact, in spite of the explicit statements in the
documents, few people outside of -the legal profession would have
regarded the transaction as involving an actual transfer of title. And,
as a very considerable number of settlements were made on credit,
'0 Supra note 27.
,1 (I785) 2 Luders' Elec. Cas. 450.
"Crickdale contest (785) 2 Luders' Elec. Cas. 470.
Lee v. Hutchinson (i85o) 8 C. B. 16; Rolleston v. Cope (i87o) L. R. 6 C. P.
292.
" See, for example, Va. Act XVI of Jan. 6, 1639, 1 Hening Laws, 227; Act XII
of M. 2, 1642-3, ibid. 248; Mass. Act of Oct 3o, 1697, 1 Acts & Resolves (1869)
298.
"Mass. Act of Dec. -io, I698, 1 Acts & Resolves (1869) 356; Act of March 25,
1713, ibid. 703; Pa. Act of Jan. 12, 1705, 2 Stat at L. (1896) 244.
' Moliere v. Noe (18o6, Pa.) 4 DaIL 450; Erskine v. Townsend (I8O7) 2 Mass.
493; Rockwell v. Bradley (186) 2 Conn. i; Brown v. Cram (I818) 1 N. H. 169;
Parsons v. Welles (1821) 17 Mass. 419; Blaney v. Bearce (1822) 2 Me. 132;
Faulkner v. Brockenbrough (1826, Va.) 4 Rand. 245; Jamieson v. Bruce (1834,
Md.) 6 G. & J. 72. See Judge Trowbridge, Mortgages, 8 Mass. 554.
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that is, on borrowed money secured either by mortgage or vendor's
lien, there grew up in each community a large group, given to rather
informal dealings with land at the best, accustomed to regard with a
jealous eye all institutions favorable to the creditor class. The
atmosphere was distinctly unfavorable, to the literal enforcement of
the mortgagee's legal rights.
South Carolina was the first state to attempt to bring its mortgage
law into harmony with the common misunderstanding of the public.
It is quite significant that this undertaking was part of the reform
legislation that followed the constitutional convention of 179o. The
Act of 1791, reciting in its preamble that mortgages were generally
meant merely as securities for debts and no actual estate was intended
to be conveyed, and providing a simpler method of foreclosure, went on
to enact "that no mortgagee shall be entitled to any possessory action
for the real estate mortgaged, even after the time allotted for the pay-
ment of the money secured by the mortgage is elapsed, but the mortga-
gor shall still be deemed owner of the land and the mortgagee as owner
of the money lent or due."37  This looks like a complete departure from
the common law theory, but the act went on expressly to except the
case when the mortgagor was out of possession, and a supplemental act
of 1797 gave to a release by the mortgagor of the "equity of redemp-
tion," so called, the effect of a conveyance,38 indicating, if that vere
necessary, the incorrigible conservatism of the conveyancer.
While South Carolina led the way, it is to the influence of the early
New York decisions that the growth of the so called lien theory of
mortgages must chiefly be attributed; and it is to these decisions that
one must turn in order to observe the circumstances attending the
development of the new doctrine. There was at first no departure
from precedent. "It cannot be denied," said Chief Justice Spencer in
i8o9, "that the mortgagee has the title, so far as to enable him to main-
tain ejectment on the mortgage, not only against the mortgagor, but
against such as derive title under him, subsequent to the mortgage." 9
The only variation from the common law was in requiring the mort-
gagee before ejectment to give notice to quit. This a majority of the
Supreme Court thought no hardship on the mortgagee, "while a
contrary practice may be much abused, in a country where so many
thousand estates are held in this way."40  But, while orthodox in result,
there will be found running through the cases from the beginning of the
311 Brevard, South Carolina Digest (1814) .74; Verree v. Verree (1807,
S. C. L.) 2 Brev. 211; Thayer v. Cramer (1826, S. C. Ch.) i McCord, 395.
i Brevard, South Carolina Digest (I814) 177 (see introduction p. XVIII);
State v. Laval (1827, S. C. L.) 4 McCord, 336; Simons v. Bryce (1878) io S. C.
354; Navassa Gucano Co. v. Richardson (1886) 26 S. C. 401.
"J$ackson v. DuBois, 4 Johns. 216, 22I. Accord, Jackson v. Chase (I8o6,
N. Y.) 2 Johns. 84. That the assignment of the debt will draw the land after it
is decided in Green v. Hart (i8o6, N. Y.) i Johns. 58o.
' Jackson v. Laughhead (i8o6, N. Y.) 2 Johns. 75. Contra, Keech v. Hall,
supra note 17; Rockwell v. Bradley, supra note 36.
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century dicta favorable to a wide extension of the equitable view. In
18o4 the nature of the mortgagor's interest was fully discussed in a
case where the point for decision was whether an equity of redemp-
tion was subject to sale on execution.41 The rule in England was
against so proceeding since the mortgagor's interest was regarded as
equitable assets; but in several states the practice of selling on execution
was already established, 42 and this also was the custom in New York
during the colonial period, under the Statute of 5 Geo. II, c. 7, sub-
jecting land in the colonies to sale on execution. The court adhered
to the settled procedure. "I am the more confirmed in this opinion,"
said Spencer, J., "from the general and almost universal idea and prac-
tice which has prevailed for a series of years, as well as from the legis-
lative declaration that a mortgagor in possession is a freeholder within
the meaning of the constitution, and as such entitled to vote." In this
connection it is interesting to note that the freehold qualification of
voters had been preserved in New York by the constitution of 1777'3
and was only abolished by the constitution of 1821 in deference to strong
public sentiment adverse to the exclusion from the franchise of thou-
sands of citizens who had purchased land on long term contracts by
which title did not pass until full payment of the purchase money.4
As early as 1701 the mortgagor, if in possession, had been enfran-
chised4 5 and this policy was continued in later acts.46  In the same case
Kent, J., after calling attention to the language of Lord Mansfield and
the tendency to adopt the "more rational ideas of chancery," went on
to say that if the New York practice was an innovation it was not
alarming. "A very considerable part of the lands in this state, are
' Waters v. Stewart (804, N. Y. Senate) i Caines, Gas. 46.
' In Massachusetts by the Act of July 3, 1735-6, 2 Acts & Resolves (874) 762.
In Connecticut by the court in Punderson v. Brown (28o3) i Day, 93. In
Pennsylvania estates both legal and equitable were held subject to sale on execu-
tion under the Act of 1705, supra note 35; Rickert v. Madeira (1829) I Rawle,
Pa. 325.
4' Sec. 7, I N. Y. Rev. Laws (1813) 36.
'Fox, The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York (2919) 86 Col.
Univ. Studies in Hist. 252.
'"And Whereas a Question hath arrisen whether any person or persons haveing
Mortgaged his or their Lands, and being in possession thereof, and receiving the
Income thereof, should not by reason of such mortgage be debarred from giving
his Vote, as aforesaid, BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED, That Such mortgage
shall not debar the party abovesaid from the giveing of his vote, provided he be in
possession thereof, or receive the Incomes of the Same." Act of Oct. 18, 1702,
I Colonial Laws of N. Y. (1894) 452, 453.
4 1I Kent and Radcliff, N. Y. Laws (1807) 264, sec. 15; 2 N. Y. Rev. Laws
(813) ch. 41, sec. 22. This problem did not arise in colonies not requiring the
freehold qualification for the franchise. See Bishop, History of Elections in the
American Colonies (1893) 3 Col. Univ. Studies in Hist. 8oi. In Bowers v. Oyster
(831, Pa.) 3 P. & W. 239, Kennedy, J., said he apprehended that a freeholder who
had mortgaged would still be qualified to serve as a road viewer or juror. In
State v. Ragland (1876) 75 N. C. 12, a mortgagor in possession was held a free-
holder within the jury act.
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under mortgage to the loan office, and to individuals it is likely they will
continue so; and if judgment creditors are under a necessity in every
case of resorting to chancery for leave to sell the land of the debtor, it
would create double suits and double expense, and would lead to much
inconvenience and delay."
A few years later, conversely, the interest of the mortgagee before
foreclosure and while the mortgagor was in possession was held not
subject to sale on execution. The modem cases, said Chief Justice
Kent, were tending to the same conclusions as in equity, and "whenever
the nature of the case would possibly admit of it, the courts of law have
inclined to look upon a mortgage, not as an estate in fee, but as a mere
security for a debt."4 7 In these cases the influence of Lord Hardwicke
and Lord Mansfield is manifested by the frequent citation of their
judgments, while that of the civil law, which Chief Justice Kent
frequently quoted in other connections, does not appear. Perhaps it
was unnecessary to elaborate upon points favored by obvious
convenience.
The crux of the problem was the right to possession as an incident'
of title, a difficulty that need hardly have arisen as a matter for practical
consideration, if conveyancers had been less timid and had expressly
given the right of possession to the mortgagor until default, instead of
blindly copying ancient forms. It was held in i8io that a mortgage,
before foreclosure or entry, was not such a legal title as a stranger could
set up,48 and soon afterward that a mortgagee or his assignee in posses-
sion was protected by the mortgage,4 9 both rulings conservative in
theory. But the important case, the one that marks the point of depar-
ture from the older law, was Runyan v. Mersereau,50 decided in 1814.
The action was trespass quare clausum fregit brought by the plaintiff
who was in possession as purchaser at sheriff's sale on a judgment
against the mortgagor. The defendant set up a license from the mort-
gagee to enter and cut timber, a flimsy defense under the circumstances,
for it was in evidence that the plaintiff was in possession of the bond and
mortgage under an equitable assignment. Since, however, the defen-
dant had pleaded freehold in the mortgagee and the plaintiff had replied
that the freehold was in himself, the issue was, who had the freehold?
The brief per curiam judgment quoted Lord Mansfield, 51 stated that
it was unnecessary to go into the cases and concluded: "The light in
which mortgages have been considered, in order to be consistent, neces-
sarily leads to the conclusion that the freehold must be considered in the
" Jackson v. Willard (18o9, N. Y.) 4 Johns. 41. Accord, Blanchard v. Colburn
(182o) 16 Mass. 345; Rickert v. Madeira, supra note 42.
' Collins v. Torry (i8io, N. Y.) 7 Johns. 278; Jackson v. Pratt (1813, N. Y.)
Io Johns. 381. See also Sedgwick v. Hollenback (1811, N. Y.) 7 Johns. 376.
'Denn v. Wynkoop (I811, N. Y.) 8 Johns. 129; Jackson v. Minkler (1813,
N. Y.) io Johns. 480; Phyfe v. Riley (1836, N. Y.) 15 Wend-. 248.
(1814, N. Y.) ii Johns. 534.
King v. St. Michaels, supra note 21.
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plaintiff, and he of course is entitled to judgment." It is very probable
that this question would have met with more cautious treatment had
Chief Justice, Kent still remained on the bench. Although liberal in
his attitude toward the rights of the mortgagor, he would hardly have
entered upon so marked a departure from precedent without at least
giving a fully reasoned judgment. But that learned jurist had just
left the Supreme Court to become Chancellor. Although inadequately
considered, and in direct conflict with the common law doctrine,5 2 this
case has had a decisive effect upon New York law. Its implications
are fully accepted by Chief Justice Spencer in 1819. "In the case of
Runyan v. Mersereau we went the whole length of deciding that mort-
gages are to be regarded as mere securities for money, and that the
freehold continues in the mortgagor."5  Finally, in 1828 it was pro-
vided by statute that a mortgagee or his assignee could not maintain an
action of ejectment to recover the mortgaged premises.
5 4
The result was that the Supreme Court of New York could say: "A
mortgage is now nothing but a security for a debt, giving the mortgagee
a special lien only, upon the estate mortgaged. It conveys no title to
the property. The interest of the mortgagee is a mere chattel interest.
The title and seisin remain in the mortgagor until foreclosure, and he is
not divested of his title until all the steps required by statute have been
complied with." 5  This doctrine has had wide influence and a view
essentially similar now prevails in considerably more than a majority of
states, although in New England and some of the older communities
there is a more or less close adherence to the common law.56 But it
cannot be said that the theory is consistently applied. In Phyfe v.
Riley,5 7 it was held that a mortgagee in possession, after condition
broken, could not be dispossessed in ejectment by one claiming title
through the mortgagor. "It cannot be denied," said the court, "that
the mortgagee has an interest in the mortgaged premises, and that
interest after forfeiture is a legal interest." A fraudulent purchaser
of real property may mortgage, and a bona fide mortgagee for value
See Parsons v. Welles, supra note 36; Lackey v. Holbrook (1846) 52 Mass.
458; Chellis v. Stearns (1851) 22 N. H. 312; Gilnan v. Wills (877) 66 Me.
273; 4 Kent, Commentaries, 155.
tanard v. Eldridge (18ig, N. Y.) 6 Johns. 254. See also Jackson v.
Bronson (1822, N. Y.) 19 Johns. 325; Dickkinson v. Jackson (1826, N. Y.)
6 Cow. r47; Jackson v. Bowen (1827, N. Y.) 7 Cow. 13.
2 N. Y. Rev. Sts. 1828, pt 3, ch. 5, tit. I, sec. 57. So also in N. Y. C. C. P.
1876, sec. 1498, and N. Y. C. P. A. 192o, sec. 991.
'Bryan v. Butts (1857, N. Y.) 27 Barb. 503.
See i Jones, Mortgages (7th ed. 1915) 22 et seq. for a summary. In Louis-
iana the mortgage is the hypothec of the civil law. La. Civ. Code, 187o, art. 3278-
3411.
"Supra note'49, at p. 255. Accord, Bolton v. Brewster (i86o, N. Y.) 32 Barb.
389; Hubbell v. Moulson (1873) 53 N. Y. 225. So at common law Hill v. Payson
(18O) 3 Mass. 559; Jacksm v. Minkler, supra note 49. Cf. Barson v. Mulligan
(19o8) 191 N. Y. 306, 84 N. E. 75.
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will be protected against the claims of the defrauded vendor.58 In
Mickles v. Towmisend59 land subject to a mortgage by 9 prior owner was
conveyed by its then owner by warranty deed. When subsequently the
grantor became assignee of the mortgage, he was held to take it for the
benefit of his grantee. The contention that the doctrine of estoppel
did not apply, inasmuch as the mortgage was not a title but a mere
security for a debt, was denied. Said Denio, J.: "For some, and indeed
for most purposes the mortgagor is considered seised and the mortgagee
has a mere lien. Still, as between mortgagor and mo~gagee, the title
is considered as passing by the mortgage for many purposes.... I am
of opinion that for the purpose of applying the doctrine of estoppel, the
mortgagor is considered as having an equity of redemption only, the fee
being in the mortgagee and that in this case the purchase of the mort-
gage inured to the benefit of the plaintiff in the same way that a release
of the mortgage would have done."
When it comes to defining a mortgage under the lien theory the diffi-
culties are just as great as at common law. Professor Durfee suggests
that, as the new theory is a product of the courts of law, the lien of the
mortgage is a legal, as distinguished from an equitable lien. Admit-
tedly a legal lien without possession is an anomaly; but if this distinc-
tion is not made it is difficult to find a place in the scheme for the
informal or equitable mortgage.60 It is proof of the poverty of the
legal imagination that in so many instances terms definitely applied to
particular purposes are forcibly appropriated to other uses. Such
seems to be the fate of the word lien which had at common law a well
settled meaning, as well as in equity; but now, for better or worse, has
taken in the American courts a broad and somewhat vague significance,
approximating roughly to the continental hypothec. Indeed the Cali-
fornia Civil Code very properly, from the viewpoint of its draughtsman,
defines a mortgage as "a contract by which specific property is hypothe-
cated for the performance of an act, without the necessity of a change
of possession." 6 ' After all the mortgage transaction that our law
has slowly and empirically developed is sui generis. Here again the
California Civil Code in its statutory form of mortgage is eloquent in
its brevity witnessing "that the mortgagor mortgages to the mortga-
gee" the property described 2 echoing Baron Parke's dictum that a mort-
gagor "can be described merely by saying he is a moftgagor."63
Thd law of mortgages in England and America in its progress is
travelling almost the same road as the Roman law, but its path has
been beset by more difficulties. Chief of these is the difference in atti-
' Simpson v. Del Hoyo (1883) 94 N. Y. 189; Swanstrom v. Day (1905, Sup.
Ct) 46 Misc. 311, 93 N. Y. Supp. 192.
(1859) 18 N. Y. 575.
The Lien or Equi able Theory of the Mortgage (1912) 10 MICH. L. REv. 587.
,' Calif. Civ. Code (1872) see. 2920.
' Ibid. sec. 2948.
'Litchfield v. Ready (i85o) o L. J. Exch. 51.
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tude toward real and personal property at common law, a matter of
which Roman law made little account. At common law a mortgage
is a conveyance and conveyancing is in England an extremely compli-
cated art. Mortgages form an integral part of many family settlements.
To change their legal theory, to upset precedents, might be attended by
consequences not easily foreseen. In the United States conveyancing
has always been simpler than in the mother country, in some communi-
ties very informal indeed, affording the courts wider scope for interpre-
tation, more room for innovation. Yet in both countries, notwith-
standing the stubborn conservatism of forms and the conflict of deci-
sions; however difficult it may be for the jurist to define accurately
this complex transaction, the mortgage of to-day does not mean the
same thing to the parties that it did to their ancestors when borrowing
money to go to the Crusades. The creditor's security is no longer
physical but legal. He would not have it otherwise, although occasion-
ally powers or rights belonging to the dim past are revived to meet
special emergencies. Indeed the very intricacy of the relation, in so
far as it gives flexibility to the remedial powers of the courts, may
possibly further the ends of justice.
